SELECTIONS FROM

MOULANA MOHAMMED ALI'S

Comrade



THE ONLY ACKNOWLEDGE HERO WHO SIMULTANIOUSLY FOUGHT BRITISHERS FOR INDIA, CONG-RESS FOR MUSLIMS & WILLINGLY COURTED DEATH FOR TRUTH.

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89. TAGORE PARK LAHORE

concludes, 'are going on in what Europe considers an almost bankrupt State. Education, new roads, industries, a new navy, everything is needed; but Turkey will pull herself together if only she has confidence in herself.'

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'THE CHOICE OF THE TURKS'

'War is deceit,' says the Arabic proverb, and the English saying, 'Everything is fair in love and war, not only supports it, but extends it by pointing out the analogy between the opposite passions of love and hatred. The justification for deceit in love may or may not be quite clear, but the necessity for it in war is obvious. The object of war is to destrory the power of the enemy by causing him the maximum amount of harm at the minimum cost to ourselves. In primitive times reliance may have been placd entirey on force for the destruction or subjugation of the enemy; but it must soon have dawned even upon primitive man that cunning sometimes succeeds quite as well as courage, and that skill is no less effective in a struggle than strength. Leadership makes all the difference between two armies of equal strength, and often a well led but smaller army scores a success against badly-led hordes that lack nothing in the way of dash and determination. And it is not without its significance that strategy or military leadership and stratagem, or wile, have one and the same derivation.

The point is in fact too obvious to be laboured; but what we desire to explain is that stratagems have their use not only on the field of battle when war has begun, but also in the Chancellories before and during a war. It is not sufficient for a nation to make no strategic mistakes in the course of a campaign. It must not also commence a campaign with political mistakes of any importance nor commit them in the course of that campaign. Mr. W. S. Blunt tells us in his 'Secret History of the British Occupation of Egypt,' that the late Sir Auckland Colvin, who had unceasingly worked for the forcible intervention of Great Britain in the internal difficulties of Egypt and had denied himself all rest and many comforts during some weeks preceding the bombardment of Alexandria, went to sleep immediately after boarding the British man-o'war and the commencement of the bombardment, and slept the sleep of peace in spite of the cannonading. Now the Chancellories of nations at war with each other cannot afford to enjoy the sleep of the just in similar circumstances. When diplomatists bent upon war have worked up the passions of the people to the pitch necessary for their purpose, and the first acts of war have in consequence already occurred, leaving not even a 'sporting' chance for an early re-establishment of peace, they do not go to bed with an easy conscience and the satisfaction

of having done their duty. They work all the more in order to reap for their country or their party the full harvest of benefits which they anticipate from the war. A Foreign Minister has seldom a shorter day than one of eight hours even in the piping times of peace. But when the drums of Mars drown the music of the pipes of Pan, the Foreign Minister is extremely lucky, if not extemely lazy, who can get eight hours in the day and night that he can call his own. It is not only the army that has a Great General Staff. Diplomacy too has its General Staff, and its Napoleon or Moltke. It is not only the battle-field but the bureau of foreign affairs also that has its strategy and its tactics. The object of war, as we have stated, being to destroy the power of the enemy by causing him the maximnm of harm at the minimum cost to ourselves, what could be a better strategy for effecting this purpose than to induce one of our neighbours to fight our battles, or, at least, to share our risk and travail? The object of the invitation is not exactly identical, but nevertheless many a message is sent by the Spider to the Fly, begging in the sweetest possible manner that the Fly should forsake the freedom of its neutrality and enter the Spider's snug, little parlour of belligerency. In this the greatest struggle since the dawn of the world at which it is our privilege or misfortune to 'assist,' it could not be that neutral nations could escape the blandishments of the belligerents. Every State that is still fancy-free must have her maiden meditations constantly disturbed by the attentions of militant suitors. Appeals to worldly interest must be succeeding those to mere sentiment, and flattery must be following in the footsteps of reminders of long devotion.

The two Powers most persistently sought after to-day are Italy and Turkey, and it is an object lesson in persuasiveness to watch the efforts of Alliance and *Entente* to secure this consent. The struggle for the hand of Great Britain did not last very long. That was an easy elopement. The Teuton's engagementring cast off by Italy was soon after placed by the Slav and the Celt on the finger of Britain, and within a day or two exchanged for one still more binding in its significance. But Germany and Austria did not for a long time lose all hope of bringing Italy to the fulfilment of her plighted troth, while the *Entente* Group of Powers has even to-day lively expectations of inducing the jilt to say to the 'Wilt thou of the priezt a half reluctant but effectively binding 'I will.' Turkey, hated and oppressed all her life by one of the *Entente* trio, neglected and in practice deprived of her rights by the other two since the eighties of the last century spoliated by two of the Alliance Powers and only flirted and played with by the third, all of a sudden discovers herself to be a person whose affections are of some consequence and are neither to be slighted nor altogether taken for granted. She has to be won, and therefore to be wooed, or, at least, to be persuaded to believe that hated rivals at any rate are no proper match for her. The whirligig of time brings many changes, but a change of sentiment from hatred or utter estrangement to love cannot be so easily effected. It needs much

persuasion and a world of tact. We have been told—and we have ourselves seen enough to be convinced of it—that German diplomacy is 'stupid.' Of Sir Edward Grey's diplomacy we desire to say nothing at present, and, in fact, can say nothing at any time except this that, like the man who had caught a Tartar, his tact has captivated the Tartar of Muscovy. There has so far been no other opportunity for the display of his diplomacy if we may consider the debtor and creditor sides of his account as cancelling each other when, after having proudly preserved the 'Peace of Europe' for eight long years, he finds his country plunged in a war of unparalleled proportions. To-day we are concerned entirely with the tactful *Times* and its retailing of tact—in two qualities.

To take the case of Italy. Macaulay in his 'Essay onMachiavelli' says that while ruder nations usually attained their ends by hard blows, among the polished Italians everything was done by superiority of intelligence. Their very wars, more pacific than the peace of their neighbours, required rather civil than military qualifications. Hence, while courage was the point of honour in other countries, ingenuity became the point of honour in Italy. Lest we should be held responsible for traducing this gifted artistic nation, and come under the lash of the custodians of law, let us repeat that the author of these observations was Macaulay, once Law Member of the Government of India, and—what is perhaps more significant—the author of a still more tremendous judgment on the Province of the Lower Ganges. Well, the *Times* evidently needed all its tact in the effort to persuade Italy to tie herself to a new suitor so soon after disentangling herself from a prior attachment. We do not blame the *Times* for the effort, for it is the most natural thing for that journal to do after its sweeping success in converting the Liberal Party and some members of the Labour Party also in England to the foreign policy of the Tories. Never was success more complete and never did a journal organise a political campaign with more skill and efficiency. Whatever our own opinion about the genesis of the war and its 'responsibilities,' we must frankly recognise that the policy of the present war is to-day the national policy of Great Britain, and so long as she is one of the belligerents it is the duty of every loyal subject of His Majesty at least to refrain from all acts which may in any manner and to any degree embarrass His Majesty's Government in conducting this war to a successful issue. But because we are convinced that in no way our own words uttered in an obscure corner of the world influence the Government and people of Italy, we venture to point out the contrast between the *Times*, manner in dealing with the two neutral States, Italy and Turkey.

The terms of the Triple Alliance have never been published. Hence it may be that in declaring her neutrality in this war, and not throwing in her lot with her old Allies, Italy has *not* looked upon the treaty with Austria and Germany as a mere 'scrap of paper' as the German Chancellor regards the treaty concerning Belgian neutrality, as a bit of faded writing

scrawled a generation ago, as at least one English journal characterised the treaty of Alliance renewed only a couple of years ago, but that, on the contrary, she has adhered to it to the letter. So much about honour. As regards her interests, the moment she created for herself commiments in the Tripolitan littoral along the southern coast of the Mediterranean we were convinced that the Triple Alliance was dead that thencefor. ward only the Dual Alliance of Austria and Germany remained. Her navy, which was her chief attraction for her Allies, could not assist them in the Mediterranean the Adriatic against England and France without placing her occupation of the Tripolitan littoral in jeopardy. Now that she is not assisting them, she may just as well make a bid for *Italia Irredenta* and redeem it by force of arms. A better opportunity is certainly not likely to recur. This may not have the appearance of altruism, but after the acquisition of Tripoli she should not find that to be an insurmountable obstacle even if her diplomats cannot devise a neat formula to garnish her greed. Possibly she is only waiting to see on which side the Cat of Fortune jumps, and though, for all the apologia of the *Times*, 'her own time' may not suit the *Entente* Powers equally well as now and to-day, it seems certain that Italy would under no circumstances fight on the side of the Hapsburgs. The *Times* has, therefore, adopted a well-considered and appropriate method of first defending Italy with much apparent warmth against criticisms upon her inaction in the present war, which, according to that journal, 'do not make allowances for the difficulties of the position in which the sudden outbreak of hostilities has placed her,' and then asking her to reflect 'what would be the consequences to her prestige and to her power were these (the British and the French) Fleets to liberate the Slavs over against her coast, and even the Italians of Dalmatia and of Istria while she stood idly by.' We have not the least doubt that, as the *Times* says, her old Allies have made her alluring offers, but she has obviously refused to be allured. She hastened to declare her neutrality. 'What more could she have done,' asks the *Times*. 'In what other way could she have met with propriety the immediate needs of the situation? Was it reasonable to expect that she would have forthwith assailed her Allies before any of her own interests were directly menaced? What judgment would her self-respect have pronounced upon such action?' Now, while we offer to the *Times* our humble tribute of admiration for such a subtle preamble to the final appeal to Italy's sense of her 'deep and vital interest' which should 'bring her, of her own free will and as mistress of her own destinies, into line with them (English and France) in the present struggle,' we cannot help remarking that though the argument and the manner are characteristic of the *Times*, they do not accord well with the utterances of Ministers of the Crown such as Mr. Asquith and the writings of such leaders of thought as Mr. H. G. Wells, whose sincerity is obvious to everybody no matter what he thinks himself about the genesis of the war.

However, we did not set out to judge, but only to compare and contrast.

Let us now turn to the tact displayed by the *Times* in trying to help the Turk to make his choice. Although we have already expressed it as our emphatic opinion that from the Turk's own point of view—after all the only point of view that the Turk could appreciate—it is better that he should maintain the strictest neutrality in the present struggle, it is with a pang of regret that we peruse the *Times* article on "The Choice of the Turk' and fail to find the least trace of the possible existence of a third altenative besides the two, neutrality and support of Germany—the alternative of supporting the Ally of the Crimean War and of the Berlin Conference. To the extent that the Turk has wantonly destroyed the capital of good-will that stood to his credit in England in the the days of Palmerston, of the 'Great Elchi' and of Disraeli, he stands guilty and condemned. But how many Mussalmans are convinced that not an iota of responsibility lies at the door of England of fanatical Gladstone, of cynical Salisbury, of sleepy Lowther, and of a whole host of present-day Ministers, both the silent and the blabbing varieties, for the deplorable estrangement of to-day? But let that pass. This is not the time to apportion praise or blame. We have launched our brack on this perilous sea for another and a more practical purpose. Whosoever may have been responsible for the present state of Anglo-Turkish relations, we desire that instead of there being no trace of a possibility of Turkey throwing in her lot with the English there should at least be no trace of the possibility of her throwing in her lot with the enemies of England. But for that, is the tact of the *Times*—the other quality the most effective method?

While every allowance has been made for 'the difficulties of the position in which the sudden outbreak of hostilities has placed Italy,' is there none that the Turk deserves for the difficulties of *his* position? From every source available to us we have ascertained that, as every sane person would do, the Turk desires nothing better than peace for at least a decade. If ever war was sudden, it was the Balkan War. If ever was found a nation wholly unprepared it was the Turks in Octobe 1910. If ever war was absolutely unrighteous it was the one waged by the Balkan Allies. If ever the sword was thrust into a people's hands it was thrust into the hands of the Osmanlis on that occasion. If ever war was waged brutally it was waged by the robber hands of the Balkans whether they were the Komitadjis or formed part of the regular troops of the Allies. If ever a treatly was treated as a mere 'scrap of of paper' it was the Treaty of Berlin. And if ever a judge was guilty of gross partiality it was the Powers to whom Turkey appealed repeatedly in her need and appealed invariably in vain. Practically the whole of Belgium has been overrun by the Germans and is now in German occupation. But Germany has not yet annexed Belgium as Italy had 'annexed' Tripoli before she had even occupied it. Germany in her last war against France had occupied Paris and captured Belfort. But the Treaty of Luxembourg did not leave a German garrison at Belfort much less cede Paris to Germany as the Treaty of London would left a Bulgarian

garrison Adrianople even before it taken, in fact ceded Salonika to Greece although it was occupied through some reachery without a shot having been fired, and would have also ceded Constantinople if the Tchataldja lines had not provided extensive graveyard for Bulgarian assailants of Europe and had not the disinterestedness and generosity of Russia and Greece and, in fact, of the whole of Europe totally failed them when faced by the idea of a Bulgarian occupation of ancient Byzantium which they considered as their own destined prey. Providence in its inscrutable ways caused discord between the Allies and the bandits quarrelled over the booty. The *Grandes Puissances* that had only fifteen years ago turned back Turk from the gate of Athens became the *Grandes Impuissances* and could not make Roumania a bate an iota of its shamelessly unjust demands on Bulgaria, nor save a shred of their great creation, the Treaty of London, from being torn up at Bukharest. Because Austria threatened the 'Peace of Europe," Servia—"little Servia' of the great victory of Shabataz—was cleared out of Durazzo and the formula of protecting small nations was improvised. Albania—considerably curtailed to suit Greek sensibilities— was handed over to the Albanians and the Albanians, among whom Mussalmans, were far more numerous than people of any other denomination, were handed over to a Prince of German extraction, when it is an open secret that an Indian Mussalman of approved loyalty was available for the throne of the M'Pret. Bt Greece, foiled in her greed in Albania, must needs have some compensation. Who could be despoiled more safely and securely than Turkey? So she demanded, among others, the Islands of Chios and Mitylene. These were two loaded pistols one for each temple of the Asiatic Turk's Asiatic Empire just as much as Antwerp or Flushing in German hands must be in the case of England, and as Heligoland is to a smaller extent proving now to be. Heedless of all protests the Turks struck to Adrianople and Adrianople has struck to them. Had *Georgio Averoff* been purchased by the Turks when it was offered to them before it became Greek, and on account of its speed and the range of its guns gave to Greece the supremacy of the Aegean Sea and to the Allies most of the successes that they achieved, Chios and Mitylene would have also struck to the Turks as the Turks are still sticking to them. But *Averoff* belongs the Greeks and Powers have not yet decided the fate of Chios and Mitylene. For nearly two years a Ministry of murderes, according to the *Times*, but of patriots according to British conscience has been at the helm and has hitherto safely steered the ship of State. They realised that a stronger navy was a *sine qua non* for a nation that would sit astride and control the sea horses of Marmora with one foot in the stirrup of Europe and another in the stirrup of Asia. Impoverished by war, crushed by defeat, bled by the usurious bourses of Europe, harassed by civil strife, instigated and encouraged by some of the foreign Powers, they yet succeeded, by starving their State employees, snatching away their trinkets from their women and sharing with the very *Hammals* their

daily earnings, in scraping together enough cash to purchase two Dreadnoughts and two destroyers. These meant the fate of Chios and Mitylene and ultimately of Constantinople and Asia Minor. A few days before these ships were expected to be in Turkish waters and no more than 48 hours before Rauf Bey, the intrepid captain of the 'Hamidiyeh,' could hoist on their masts the red ensign of the Crescent, a war broke out in Europe which promised to be universal. As anyone would have easily guessed, who was not so entirely lost in the contemplation of a near future in which two of the most powerful Dreadnoughts in the world would ride at anchor in the blue waters of the Bosphorus, Great Britian, as desirous of hacking her way through on the high seas as the Germans are on land, exercised her right of requisitioning the two Dreadnoughts and the two destroyers of Turkey still in her dockyards. This is what any Power so circumstanced as Great Britain would have done, and no blame attaches to her for thinking of her own needs before those of the Turks. But it was the case of the Caliph's palace and the old woman's hut all over. For the Caliph it was all a matter of symmetry and surroundings. For the old woman it was all the difference between a home and homelessness. English journalists, ridiculing weakness as if it were falsenees, had sneered at the petty Ottoman officials satisfying their own and their children's hunger with looking at the picture of the *Reshadiyeh* and the *Brinji Osman*. These were not merely ships to them but also their food and their clothing, the heavy-footed porter's extra burden carried from day to day and the woman's primeval desire of adornment suppressed and unsatisfied. If in reply to their passionate protest an ancient precedent was quoted or a reference given to a certain chapter and page of Professor Westlake's standard work on International Law, what meaning could it have for these simple sacrificing people? Again, when the doors of all the banks and bourses were closed to them, Greece, which ought not yet to command more confidence than Turkey if only commercial consideraction entered into these transactions, could easily obtain the necessary cash to purchase from the United States two of their battleships, the *Idaho* and the *Mississipi*, and obtain the sanction of President Wilson to their delivery 'for the preservation of peace.' There was no ship in the Turkish Navy to match even *Averoff* with its speed of 23 or 24 knots an hour. Even the *Hamidiyeh's* speed is only 22 knots an hour. Imagine then the Turkish consternation at the news that the *Idaho* an the *Mississipi* with a displacement of 13,000 tons and an armament including four 12-in. guns would soon be in the Aegean. But Providence knows as well as human beings the law of substitution. A year ago a Power higher than they had given back Adrianople to the Creeks when the Powers had given it to the Bulgarians. Once again the prophetic verse of Shibli came true:

عجب کیا ہے یہ بیڑا غرق ہو کر پھر اچھل آئے
کہ ہم نے انقلاب چرخ گردوں یوں بھی دیکھے ہیں

(What wonder if this fleet once sunk comes to the surface again; for thus too have we seen the

vicissitudes of the revolving firmament.)

So far as the Turks were concerned the *Reshidiyeh* and the *Brinji Osman* had both gone to the bottom of the sea. Now the sea has given back one of these at least in the shape of the *Goeben* (or *Yavouz Sultan Selim*) and another but a smaller vessel in the shape of the *Breslau* (or *Midilli*) wherewith to recapture Khans, or Chios, and Midilli or Mitylene. Both have a speed of about 27 knots an hour, and the former has a displacement of 22,635 tons and ten 11-in guns, to which the *Averoff* can only oppose a speed of 23 or 24 knots and four 9.2-inch guns. The moment these ships entered the Dardanelles and Reuter wired that they would be dismantled, we felt so sure about it that we could that minute have taken our oath on it that nothing of the sort would be done and that Turkey would give a permanent asylum to and adopt as her own the two German waifs and strays.

The Turkish papers published the news of the sale gleefully within a few hours of the transaction. Reuter did not wire it to us until several days later. But when England heard of the sale, what did she do? She construed this as a violation of neutrality and in company with two neutrals, that had no *locus standi* in the matter, Italy and Greece, began to protest and to threaten. And why? It is true that the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* did not go to the bottom of the sea. But they were lost to the Germans just the same. Did they endanger the safety of the British coast? Not a bit. What danger then did England apprehend from them? 'They are hankering after Salonika,' remarks the *Times*. But what is Salonika to England or England to Salonika that she should care a burnt match for it? Nothing, at any rate, that the Mussalmans can appreciate whether in Beirout or Bengal. And why should they not hanker after Salonika?

STRASSBURG AND SALONIKA

Yes, why not? Are not the Turks men? Do they not have feelings and sensibilities as other men? Look at France. Had she forgotten the claims of *Revanche* nearly half a century after the loss of Alsace and Lorraine? M. Ernest Lavisse, the eminent French historian, recalling in the *Temps* columns of the experiences and memories of forty-four years ago, writes:

'Since the terrible year (1871) I have never for a moment despaired. The hope and the confidence which were in me I have preached tirelessly. To millions of children I have explained repeatedly their permanent duty towards the lost provinces; for the Cathedral spire of Strassburg has never faded from my horizon. I have always seen it mounting up towards heaven in its solitude: "I am Strassburg, I am Alsace, I have a signal, I wait."

But what of Salonika? It could not have been necessary to explain repeatedly to millions of Turkish children 'their permanent duty' towards the lost vilayets of Turkey. That was not lost four years ago. Not half as many months have passed since the surrender of Salonika by Kiamil and Nazim who, if they had been Englishmen and had acted as they did, would have been torn limb from limb by the nation that they had betrayed. And yet we know

better than the whole brood of bars at the Printing House Square that Enver, that fine flower of Moslem chivalry whom the *Times* has never failed to traduce, shrank for a long time from attempting the *coup*, not from want of courage—for even if needed proof the 23rd of Jaunary, 1911, itself proved it amply enough—but from motives of patriotism and humanity. Does not Salonika call the Turks as Strassburg has been calling the French? Has not the dome of its Aya Sofia, or the ancient pile of its Eski Juma or Old Mosque, the same meaning for the Osmanli warrior or statesman that the Cathedral spire of Strassburg has for the French historian? Does it not flash across the dividing land and sea the never changing message: 'I am Islam—the Unity of your Allah, the Truth of His Messenger. I am a signal. I wait'? Can its neat white houses enclosed by their white walls, scattered on the edge of its bay and the summit of its hill, and mingling with the domes and minarets of its mosques that rise through groves of elm and cypress and mulberry, ever fade from the Turk's horizon? Cyrenica, with Tripoli, was the hush-money that they had paid to the blackmailer of Rome. They had reluctantly paid that price in order to be free to go to war in the Balkans and had reluctantly bidden adieu to their Arab brethren because their own hearths and homes had to be defended. But when they lost Salonika they also lost the memorial of an early Moslem victory, for Salonika had been first stormed by their spiritual ancestors from Cyrenica a thousand years ago. Between the tenth century and the fifteenth the Turks themselves thrice held it before Murad II captured it finally for the House of Osman and for Islam twenty-three years before his son earned the title of the 'Conqueror' by capturing the city of Constantine. For the patriots that have on two occasions redeemed Turkey and now rule her she has more recent memories no less sacred. It was from Salonika that this heroic band of their country, suspected, imprisoned and exiled, worked the overthrow of a soul-killing despotism. Salonika is to them the cradle of Turkey regenerated and reborn.

WHAT DOES SALONIKA SAY?

Let us ask what Salonika says itself about the return of the Turk. Half of her population of a hundred thirty thousand souls consists of Sephardhic Jews. They are the descendants of those who had fled thither in the 16th century to escape religious persecution in Spain, since Spain was no longer ruled by the Moors, but was under the Christian sway of Ferdinand and his successors who persecuted and exiled Moslem and Jew alike with perfect impartiality. Heine writes that when he saw the *Merchant of Venice* at Drury Lane there stood behind him in the box a pale, fair Briton, who, at the end of the Fourth Act, fell aweeping passionately, several times exclaiming: The poor man is wronged.' He adds: When I think of those tears I have to rank the *Merchant of Venice* with the Tragedies. . . .Wandering, dream-hunted that I am, I looked round everywhere on the Rialto to see if I could not find Shylock. . . .But I found him nowhere on the Rialto, and I determined to seek my old acquaintance in the synagogue.. . . .

Although I looked all round the synagogue, I nowhere discovered the face of Shylock. I saw him not. But towards evening, when, according to Jewish belief, the gates of Heaven are shut and no prayer can then obtain admittance, I heard a voice, with a ripple of tears that were never wept by eyes. It was a sob that could come only from a breast that held in it all the martyrdom which, for eighteen centuries, had been borne by a whole tortured people. It was the death rattle of a soul sinking down dead-tired at heaven's gates. And I seemed to know the voice, and I felt that I had heard it long ago, when in utter despair, it moaned out, then as now, "Jessica, my child!"

Salonika has for four centuries been the harbour refuge of many a Hebrew derelict, many a poor man wronged who has sobbed out his sorrow with some plaintive wail such as 'Jessica, my child.' The Mussalmans are naturally biased in favour of the Turks as the Christians are biased against them. But the Hebrew is the best arbiter, for he has had experience both of Christian and Moslem toleration. Let us ask him what he thinks of the claims of the Turks to a return to Salonika. The least sophisticated and naturally the most impartial must be the children. Well, when the Turks had been exiled from Salonika, as the Jews had been exiled four hundred years ago from Spain, and the Greeks occupied the place, one of the Greek officers went to the Jewish school and asked such boys to stand up as liked the Greeks to rule over Salonika. With great difficulty one after another three boys stood up and looked rather uncomfortable. Then the Greek officer asked them to sit down and wished such boys to get up as wanted the Turks to return. The whole of the form got up with evident alacrity—including the three who had first got up as supporters of the 'man in possession.' Take another example. Pierre Loti was one of the few Frenchmen that stood up for Turkey when she had fallen on evil days and evil tongues. In the course of his advocacy of the cause of the Turks and of truth he received among many others the following letter. It came from a Spanish Jewess like so many that live in Salonika. She wrote:

'What you have just done for the unhappy Turkey reminds me of the man who comes to sit by the death-bed of a forsaken human being and takes his hand and keeps it in his own so that the other shall not die alone.

'Please write again! May your heart help you to find, not only the words that tell, but those that persuade, those that the men who will have to give the verdict will remember in spite of themselves. Proclaim them loudly, all these reasons which prove the necessity for the existence of the poor dear nation, so little known, in truth a humble existence, but their own nevertheless. You who have lived in my adopted country testify to the comfort which your soul received there in its longing for faith, kind-heartedness, honesty, wisdom and peace. But I beg of you, do not yet speak of them with tears. Those who love Turkey have not yet the right to weep over her as over a dead body. She may not die, speak

not of the tomb. If the dreadful event took place, then only would I cry, besause I know that they will become as we are, even us poor Jews scattered here and there, without a corner that we can call our own. It is said that they are going to lose Asia also. Unhappy people!

'If you only knew this feeling of the exiled which is buried in us from our childhood, and which follows us wherever we pass! I hate to think that the Turks, whom I love, should ever know it. It is years since I left Constantinople and I thought I had forgotten. I did not know that, when one has lived among the Turks, one loves them throughout one's life. I beg of you to write again, to act. Time presses! And I thank you.'

'What could I add,' says Loti, 'after this spontaneous testimony? What could I add to it that could but weaken it?' This is the testimony of Salonika itself about the Turks and even if Salonika fades from the horizon of the Turk, would the Turk also fade from the horizon of Salonik ?

The province of Salonika is nearly three times the size of Riechland which the French desire to win back and has a population considerably more than half of France's lost provinces. Even after the loss of part of Alsace and Lorraine, France has an area hardly less than that of the conqueror who imposed on her the Treaty of Frankfurt. But what is the position of Turkey since the last war? We have before us at this moment a map of Europe in 1812, which may, for the purposes of Turkey, be regarded as the map of Europe in 1865, before Maldavia and Wallachia had become the independent State of Roumania under Prince Charles (1866); before the Ottoman garrisons had been withdrawn from Servia through the persuasive charms of Princess Julia, who went on a mission to Gladstone and Bright (1867); before Bosnia and Herzegovina came to be administered by Austria (1878) and were finally annexed by the Dual Kingdom (1908); before Bulgaria became a Principality under Prince Alexander, and Eastern Roumelia became autonomous (1879), and both became a united and independent Kingdom under Tsar Ferdinand (1908); and before Thessaly was ceded to Greece (1881). The boundaries of Turkey even then ran parallel to the boundaries of ary-Hung and Russia. The whole expanse of the country as seen on this map resembles nothing so much as a big river in the Indian plains in a flood. Those who have seen the river only at such a season can hardly recognise it as a shrunken stream in the summer. That shrunken stream was Turkey in Europe on the eve of the Balkan War. But even then the European Provinces of the Sultan had an area of more than sixty-five thousand square miles and a population exceeding six millions. A year later even the shrunken stream in the summer appears by comparison a mighty river in flood, for in less than a year European Turkey is reduced to a sixth of its dimension and its population to less than a third. If France can remember the loss of five thousand square miles and a million and a half of her population for forty-four years and cannot forget that her 'permanent duty towards the lost provinces' is

summed up in the one word 'Revenge,' a schoolboy's sum in arithmetic ought to tell us how long Turkey should keep the memory green of fifty thousand square miles and four and a quarter million people. The poet thought only of a single life when he wrote:

عرفی اگر بگریه میسر شدی وصال
صد سال میتوان به تمنا گریستن

(Urfi, if union could be secured through tears, it would be possible to weep through a hundred years.)

But what is the life of an individual, specially in the East, to the life of a nation. For nearly six hundred years the Turks have ruled over Europe and the House of Osman may well shed tears over its recent losses for a thousand years if it can shed nothing more manly. But its tradition, even as its traducers must admit, has always been to shed blood instead of tears, whether it be its enemies' or its own, and without the efforts of eminent historians to explain to them their 'permanent duty' to their lost country, hundreds of thousands of little children in schools remember twice a day, with all the fervour of patriotic song, the Balkan hills where the sun is still bleaching from day to day graveless bones of their fathers and brothers, their mothers and sisters. How could they dry their tears before the blood of their martyrs is dry on the Balkan soil? Chauvinists! Why the Turks would be something more than angels, if not something less than brutish beasts, if they could forget their loss, or the divine truth: 'In Revenge there is life.' Being men, they have not forgotten it, and within a week of mobilisation enough of them had flocked under the flag to satisfy the first requirements of the army.

We know the impulse that moves the Truks to-day, and we also know that opportunity gives it a greater momentum. On the last occasion when they were forced to unsheath the scimitar they were not ready. They were lulled by some of the Powers and betrayed by their own rulers. They found themselves surrounded by four enemies, to their north, to their west and to their south. The unexpected combination of Bulgaria and Greece gave them a configuration of frontiers wholly disadvantageous, and the stupid credulity of the Albanians, who had only a little while ago been instigated by their enemies to revolt on the promise of autonomy—God save the mark!—deprived them of the full support of some of their most dashing troops. What is more, their 'Ottomanism' was rewarded by the surrender of their Christian fellow-subjects in companies and whole battalions—a thing that the Moslem troops of England have never done on our frontier when fighting against Moslems and will never do in Egypt or Germany. Well, the Turks have cut their losses in men as well as area, and the Albanians have learnt the value of the Ottoman flag which they have at last hoisted on Durazzo. The Prince of Wied first sent away his wife and children and has now himself returned to fight for the Fatherland. If Servia had been able to take it she would not have allowed the Albanians to occupy the port on which she had set her heart and for the loss of which the Servians wreaked their vengeance at Serajevo. There is no Conference of Ambassadors

now, at any rate, to turn her back from the gateway to the Adriatic, and neither Franz Ferdinand nor Franz Joseph can thwart her wishes. She is evidently too busy on the Drina to think of Durazzo. Montenergros' northward march on Serajevo may be trusted to keep her away from Scutari in the south. At any rate, Essad Pasha is still in the land of the living and his experience of the M'pret will not incline him to be any kinder to Montenegrins to-day than he was a year ago. Roumania is not in direct contact with Turkey at any point and is not very likely to risk the fruits of her easy victory of last year by attacking Turkey through Bulgaria. And human nature in general, and Bulgarian nature in particular, must have changed remarkably within a year if Bulgaria is sufficiently reconciled to the Treaty of Bukharest not only to stand idly by when Greece or Roumania as well as Servia are otherwise engaged, but also to allow Roumania or Greece to attack Turkey through her territory. As for Greece, the one thing that had restrained the Turks from wreaking their revenge on the country they had been compelled to spare in the course of their triumphal procession in 1897—miscalled war—was Europe, and now that Europe is not, so to speak, 'in being,' but only 'hopes to be,' the path is clear for an attack by land, if Bulgaria wishes to try conclusions with Constantine the Bulgar-killer, or by sea, if Bulgaria remains neutral. The last war was the war of *Georgio Averoff* only, but even then the 'Hamidiyeh' had put the fear of God into Greece. Now that Turkey combines with a commander such as Rauf Bey a cruiser such as *Yavouz Sultan Selim*, the Turkish Navy will have another role than that of escorting the transports across the Marmora and shelling the Bulgarians from Derkos and Buyuk Chekmeji. If Turkey chooses to strike Greece when her patron saint, Russia, cannot come to her rescue, who can blame her?

The attitude of the *Times* is perfectly comprehensible, for between Northcliffe and the city on the Neva, whether it still calls itself St. Petersburg or, like Harmsworth 'ennobled,' changes its name, there has been for years a direct and an open connection. Instead of the Russian censor inking the whole columns of the *Times*, or the Tsar turning the *Times* correspondent out of All the Russias, the latter wires to it the appreciation by the Tsar of its appreciation of the Russian avalanche, and the *Times* now issues 'Russian Supplements' more than once a year. If the *Times* would not favour Russia and her protege, angels will not come from Heaven nor devils from Hell to do it. But what interests have England and France in the spoliation of Turkey by Greece? The Treaty of Bukharest is not the Treaty of London that Sir Edward should hold it as sacrosanct. It is and will always remain a mere 'scrap of paper,' if it remains even that, when Turkey and Bulgaria or both are in a position to readjust now the relations thereby recognised as then existing. Indian Mussalmans hate the idea of a British and Ottoman collusion, whether military or diplomatic. But Greece is not Great Britain, and the authorities are greatly mistaken if they are led to believe that Turkish neutrality means anything more than

Turkish neutrality in the struggle between Austria and Germany on the one side and England, France and Russia on the other. The *Times* is wiser and offers no reason against the Turks taking a bit of their own back from Greece. But the smaller reptile, the *Near East*, has no such reticence. It writes a leader in its issue of the 4th September under the heading of 'A Word of Warning' and commences it with the following:

'Little more than two years ago we received a letter from the Imperial Ottoman Embassy in London acknowledging that 'the *Near East* has strenuously and impartially defended the interests of the (Ottoman) Empire" and referring to the "loyal and friendly attitude of the *Near East* toward Turkey" which, it was hoped, "would facilitate the re-establishment of more friendly relations between England and Turkey, a result which is in conformity with the interests of the two countries." We quote these sentences as showing that *for* years past the *Near East* has laboured unceasingly to promote the traditional friendship which has so long existed between Great Britain and the Porte.'

We have taken the liberty to italicise one small preposition in the last sentence, for it must be the creation of the Printer's Devil. What the *Near East* must have meant is that it was not *for*, but *in* years past, that it had tried to promote the traditional friendship between the largest Moslem State and the State that has the largest Moslem population. When the *Near East* was first issued in 1907 in a somewhat different form it certainly aimed at promoting those relations. But more recently its Constantinople and Cairo correspondents have been the vilest calumniators of the best elements in Turkey and Egypt and its editorial observations have been weak echoes of Downing Street diplomacy. We do not wonder that 'little more than two years ago' the *Near East* got a *chit* that it is exhibiting so boldly. But is that the latest 'reference'? Besides, its own character has not changed so radically in recent times as the character of the people whose 'reference' it is using. 'Little more than two years ago' Kiamil and his gang were ruling Turkey, while Talaat and Javid were in prison and Enver was redeeming the honour of Turkey in Tripoli! Now this very ingenious journal thinks that 'from its proved friendship to the Ottoman Empire in the past' it is 'entitled to utter a word of warning to an old friend.' The warning is: 'keep the peace.' Evidently the *Near East* has forgotten the well-known adage of the Middle East:

هر چه برخود نپسندی بر دیگران هم مپسند

(Whatever thou likest not for thyself do not choose for others.)

But let that pass. The question is not of Turkey's declaring war against an old friend which according to the *Near East*, in 1908 'forbore to "regularise" her position in Cyprus and Egypt, preferring to consider herself bound by her agreements,' even though the agreements that *should* have bound the old friend were those which said in unequivocal terms that the friend was to have no position *in* Egypt - not even an 'irregular' one. We fully agree that 'events in western Europe are of no immediate interest to them and that they have no call whatever to feel any obligation to participate in the *present war*.' (The italics are

ours.) But the question is of a war between Greece and Turkey and the *Near East* 'forbids the banns' with the naive remark: 'Nor, if they are wise, will they embark upon a private war of their own. *As matter stand there is no room in Europe for two separate and distinct wars.*' Pray why so? The *Near East* is once more innocent of the reticence of the *Times.* It supplies an answer in these words: 'If the Sultan once more takes the field, he is bound to find himself in opposition to one or other of the groups of warring powers or their proteges.' Ay, there's the rub. So far as the High Contending Parties are themselves concerned, the poor Turk may avoid a brush with them. But the order of the day is 'Love me, love my dog,' and the Turk has an aversion to the breed. What has England to do with proteges? Neither honour nor interest requires her intervention in any conflict between Greece and Turkey. Great Britain was no signatory to the Treaty of Bukharest as she was to the treaty guaranteeing the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, though we need not refer to it since it has been associated with the name of a capital that is now associated with a brutal frankness in the description of sacred screeds.

Hitherto we have discussed the question of a conflict between the Turks and the Greeks. Let us now trun to the question of a conflict between the Turks and one or more of the Allies. Against Russia the Turks have innumerable grievances, for after the Hungarians and the Poles had stemmed the tide of Turkish advance the Russians found them an easy prey and have ever since been assailing them in their retreat from the walls ot Vienna. Every revolt against Turkey in Europe and Asia Minor has been instigated by Russia, and the object has not been the protection of small nationalities as in the case of Belgium to-day, but to detach them from Turkey as her own destined prey. The Slav nations and the followers of the Orthodox Church are supposed to be her proteges, but she does not love her proteges as herself. The 'Big Bulgaria' of the treaty of San Stefano was a hope rather than a threat, but even when the 'Big Bulgaria' of that treaty, wrung from impotence by treachery, did not materialise, Prince Alexander of Bulgaria ceased to be a *persona grata* to the Tsar the moment he set himself up as the symbol of Bulgaria's national identity. Prince Ferdinand's experience has been no better, and since he assumed the title of Tsar and proclaimed his independence he has been a thorn in the Russian side. Russia assisted him in the formation of the Balkan League, but when Bulgaria came out of the war with Turkey so well, the jealousy of Bulgaria and its Tsar got the better of the protection of 'the small nationalities.' It is now the turn of Greece to incur her wrath because there is a talk of Greece being given the heritage of Constantine which Russia has coveted for two hundred years. Who can blame the Turks if they have learnt to define their Fatherland like the French worshippers *Revanche*. '*Patrie?*' seid a Norman peasant who was a recruit in the conscript army of France, '*Ca veut dire tuer des Prussiens*' (Fatherland? That means killing Prussians). Well may the Turks say:

'Vatan? That means killing the Russians.'

France, besides bartering away Turkey's suzerainty in Egypt for a 'free hand' in Morocco and herself usurping Tunis, has been pegging fresh claims every day in Syria, and even when she was robbing the Church of Christ in France stood forth in the country round the Sepulchre of Christ as the protector of Latin Christianity. During the Balkan War her present President's attitude as Premier was entirely hostile to Turkey, and in spite of all efforts of Pierre Loti few in France stood up for the wronged Turk. Is the Turk likely to stand up for France to-day or spare the French when he can regain the suzerainty over Tunis? The French occupation of Tunisia and the declaration of French Protectorate over it have followed the most approved European models of 'peaceful penetration.' Its crime was its close proximity to Algeria which the French had overrun after a struggle lasting a generation. They regarded it as a 'natural adjunct' to Algeria. It was allowed to become a debtor to Europe. In 1869 it went bankrupt, a contingency which was by no means unforeseen or undesired. The triple control of Great Britain, Italy and France wes established. In 1878, at the Congress of Berlin, Lord Salisbury agreed to allow France a 'free hand' in Tunis in return for French acquiescence to the British lease of Cyprus. In 1880, France became alarmed at Italian commercial enterprise in Tunis and acted on the secret understanding with Great Britain. In 1881 a French force crossed the frontier under pretext of chastising the Khmir independent tribe in the north-east of the Regency, and, quickly dropping the mask, advanced on the capital and compelled the Bey of Tunis to accept the French Protectorate.' 'The actual conquest of the country,' adds the historian from whom we have quoted, 'was not effected without a serious struggle with Moslem fanaticism, specially at Stax,' and after that came the customary recognition of the *fait accompli* by the Power that watch over 'small nationalities.'' The Protectorate was not recognised by Turkey, the Suzerain, which claimed the Regency as part of the Ottoman dominions. But who heeds the protests of weak suzerains? France has always ignored them and punished Turkey by occupying several points across the Tunis-Tripoli frontier, including Janet which was occupied in 1906. It was reoccupied by the Turks in 1910, but pending the delimitation of the frontier Turkey withdrew her troops in deference to French protests, at the same time maintaining the claim that the Tunisians were Ottoman subjects. It would be interesting to see if Italy would now press her claims to suzerainty as Turkey's successor in Tripoli by the sacred right of 'annexation.'

As regards England, her attitude towards Turkey in the Crimean War, and subsequently at the Berlin Congress at the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish War, when Cyprus was leased to England, are only too well known. Equally well known are the facts about Egypt and the British Occupation, its original purpose and the after-thoughts that grew out of England's duty as the bailiff of Europe. Even the 'man in the street' in India knows all about the neutrality of

Egypt during the Tripoli war and the refusal of the British Agency even to premit the troops of the Suzerain to pass through the vassal country into Libya, much less assist her with the 18,000 troops for which Mohammad Ali had stipulated. We have now the converse situation when the vassal is at war with a Power on the friendliest terms with the Suzerain. We have never disguised our views about the British occupation of Egypt and have no desire to recant to-day. But no purpose would be served by going over old ground once again, and it might be thought that we desire to excite the Turks and Egyptians or the Mussalmans of India with a view to embarrassing the authorities in India and in England. So we refrain. But we do not like to play hide-and-seek with the authorities or with our readers. If we are asked whether the Turks or the Egyptians would have a moral justification in urging on the British the evacuation of Egypt our reply must unequivocally be that in view of the following clear and emphatic pledges of British statesmen we cannot consider such a request unjustifiable. Now that Europe seems to have regained her respect for old pledges and guarantees, the following should be read with interest:

'I, admiral commanding the British Fleet, think it opportune to confirm without delay once more to Your Highness that the Government of Great Britain has no intention of making the conquest of Egypt, nor injuring in any way the religion and liberties of the Egyptians. It has for its sole object to protect Your Highness and the Egyptian people against rebels." (Sir Beauchamp to Khedive Tewfik, Alexandria, July 26, 1882, published in official journal of June 28).

'I can go so far as to answer the honourable gentleman when he asks me whether we contemplate an indefinite occupation of Egypt. Undoubtedly, of all things in the world, that is a thing which we are not going to do. It would be absolutely at variance with all the principles and viewes of His Majesty's Government and the pledges they have given to Europe, and with the views, I may say, of Europe itself' (The Rt. Hon. W. E. Gladstone in the House of Commons, August 10, 1882).

'You should intimate to the Egyptian Government that it is the desire of His Majesty's Government to withdraw the troops from Egypt as soon as circumstances permit, that such withdrawal will probably be effected from time to time as the security of the country will allow it, and that His Majesty's Government hope that the time will be very short during which the full number of the present force will be maintained' [Lord Granville, December 29, 1882; Egypt, No. 2 (1883) p. 33].

'The territory of the Khedive has been recognised as lying outside the sphere of European warfare and international jealousies' [Lord Dufferin's despatch, February 6, 1883; Egypt, No. 6 (1883), p. 41].

'Had I been commissioned to place affairs in Egypt on the footing of an Indian subject State the outlook would have been different. The masterful hand of a Resident would have quickly bent everything to his will, and in the space of five years we should have greatly added to the material wealth and well-being of the

country by the extension of its cultivated area and the consequent expansion of its revenue; by the partial if not the total abolition of the *carvee* and slavery; the establishment of justice and other beneficent reforms. But the Egyptians would have justly considered these advantages as dearly purchased at the expense of their domestic independence. Moreover, H. M.'s Government have pronounced against such an alternative (Ib. p. 83).

'The uncertainty that may be in some portion of the public mind has reference to those desires which tend towards the permanent occupation of Egypt and its incorporation in this Empire. That is a consummation to which we are resolutely opposed, and which we will have nothing to do with bringing about. We are against this doctrine of annexation; we are against everything that resembles or approaches it; and we are against all language that tends to bring about its expectation. We are against it on the ground of the interests' of England; we are against it on the ground of our duty to Egypt; we are against it on the ground of the specific and solemn pledges given to the world in the most solemn manner and under the most critical circumstances, pledges which have earned for us the confidence of Europe at large during the course of difficult and delicate operations, and which, if one pledge can be more solemn and sacred than another, special sacredness in this case binds us to observe. We are also sensible that occupation prolonged beyond a certain point may tend to annexation, and consequently it is our object to take the greatest care that the occupation does not gradually take a permanent charater . . . We cannot name a day, and do not undertake to name a day, for our final withdrawal, but no effort shall be wanting on our part to bring about that withdrawal as early as possible. The conditions which will enable us to withdraw are those described by Lord Granville—restored order in the state of the country and the organisation of the proper means for the maintenance of the Khedive's authority . . . The Rt. Hon. gentleman (R. S. Northcote) has treated us as if we intended to stay in Egypt until we had brought about institutions which would do credit to Utopia. We have no such views . . . In popular language we mean to give Egypt a fair start and if we secure it order, supply a civil and military force adequate to the maintenance of order and with a man on the throne in whose benevolence and justice we have confidence, with institutions for the administration of justice under enlightened supervision and in fairly competent hands . . . if we have made a reasonable beginning towards legislative institutions into which is incarporated some seed of freedom our duty may be supposed to be complete" (Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons' August 9th, 1883).

'H. M.'s Government . . . are willing that the withdrawal of the troops shall take place at the beginning of the year 1888, provided that the Powers are then of opinion that such withdrawal can take place without risk to peace and order' [Lord Granville's despatch, June 16, 1884; Egypt. No. 23 (1884), p. 83].

'From the first we have steadily kept in view the fact that our occupation was temporary and provisional

only .... We do not propose to occupy Egypt permanently ... on that point we are pledged to this country and pledged to Europe; and if a contrary policy is adopted it will not be by us' (Lord Derby in the House of Lords, February 21st, 1885).

'It was not open to us to assume the protectorate of Egypt, because His Majesty's Government have again and again pledged themselves that they would not do so .... My noble friend has dwelt upon that pledge, and he does us no more than justice when he expresses his opinion that it is a pledge which has been constantly present to our minds .... It was undoubtedly the fact that our presence in Egypt, unrecognised by any convention .... gave the sujects of the Sultan cause for suspicion which we did not deserve' (Lord Salisbury in the House of Lords, June 10, 1887).

'When my noble frind .... asks us to convert ourselves from guardians into proprietors....and to declare our stay in Egypt permanent . . .I must say I think my noble friend pays an insufficient regard to the sanctity of obligations which the Government of the Queen have undertaken and by which they are to abide. In such a matter we have not to consider what is the most convenient or what is the more profitable course; we have to consider the course to which we are bound by our own obligations and by European Law' (Lord Salisbury in the House of Lords, August 12, 1889).

'I cannot do otherwise than express my general concurrence . . . that the occupation of Egypt is in the nature of a burden and a difficulty; and that the permanent occupation of that country would not be agreeable to our traditional policy, and that it would not be consistent with our good faith towards the Suzerain Power, while it would be contrary to the laws of Europe . . . . I certainly shall not set up the doctrine that we have discovered a duty which enables us to set aside the pledges into which we have so freely entered . . . . The thing we cannot do with perfect honour is either to deny that we are under engagements which preclude the idea of an indefinite occupation, or so to construe that indefinite occupation as to hamper the engagements that we are under by collateral considerations' (Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons, May 1, 1893).

'Great Britain has engaged herself by official agreement with Turkey and the European powers to respect suzerainty of the Sultan of Egypt. She will keep her engagement' (Sir Eldon Gorst's interview with Dr. Nimr, Editor of the *Mokattam*, October 24, 1908. This interview was acknowledged as official by Sir E. Grey in the House of Commons).

Germany's greatest offence, or at least the one that has impelled England to intervene against her, is that she has broken into an unoffending poor neighbour's house in order to jump into her enemy's house that adjoins her unoffending poor neighbour's. Belgium had every moral and legal justification to resist this trespass with force, and, whatever view one may hold of the bloodguiltiness of this Power or that, no one can find anything to blame in Belgium's heroic resistance, while there is so much to respect and admire. Now, suppose Germany

had entered Belgian territory not to invade France but to protect the King of the Belgians from his mutinous troops, and while storming Liege and defeating the Belgian army at Louvain, General Von Emmich had declared that Germany had no intention of making a conquest of Belgium, but that her sole object was to protect His Majesty and the Belgian people against rebels, and suppose Kaiser Wilhelm, Chancellor, Dr. Bethman Hollweg and Foreign Secretary, Von Jagow, had all repeatedly assured the Belgian that the occupation of Belgium was to be temporary and provisional and was on no pretext to be continued beyond the time necessary for restoring order and establishing a secure administration to assist King Albert in governing Belgium, and had even named a day—say, about six years after the bombardment of Liege—would King Albert's successor have been justified more than thirty years after the German occupation in asking Germany to evacuate the country and remove Field Marshal Von der Goltz from a position where he overshadowed the Belgian King, Ministry and Parliament? We may assume—even if it is a very rash assumption in Germany's case—that her rule was just and equitable and popular, and that she had brought the culture of Schubert and Schumann, of Hegel and Kant, of Goethe and Schiller, and not the wicked philosophy of Neitzsche nor the wile of Bismark and his blood and iron diplomacy and the masterful militarism of the 'mailed fist' and the 'shining armour' of the War Lord —even then, could Germany consider the request of the Belgian King and people unreasonable and unjust? We leave the matter to the judgment of the soberest and the most loyal in this country and the most conscientious respectors of old pledges in England.

So much about moral and legal justification. But the matter does not end there. Every act that is not illegal or immoral is not on that account obligatory. The expediency of an act has also to be taken into consideration. When morality and expediency are opposed to each other no one who values principles can say that morality must be sacrificed to expediency. But when morality is not opposed to expediency, he who does what is both expedient and morally permissible does better than he who does what is inexpedient though morally permissible. For the Turks or Egyptians to demand by force the evacantion of Egypt is to our mind morally permissible but wholly inexpedient at this juncture. Before England intervened in the Egyptian troubles she asked the Suzerain to join her in the enterprise. Abdul Hamid Khan did not join England, and France also held back. That does not by any means deprive Turkey of her rights as a Suzerain of Egypt, and it certainly did not deprive France of the power to intervene later—a power that she exchanged for a 'free hand' in Morocco. But when British intervention was not forcibly opposed by Turkey nor by the Khedive himself, it is more expedient to ask for the fulfilment of British pledges in a friendly manner rather than a hostile manner. Had Mr. Redmond asked for the Home Rule Bill, the whole Bill and nothing but the Bill

at this juncture as the price of peace in Ireland, England would have been compelled to purchase peace on his own terms. But England's difficulty was, in a sense other than that generally understood, Ireland's opportunity, and in acting as he has done Mr. Redmond has made the best of Ireland's opportunity. Mr. Balfour's churlish attitude on a recent occasion will bring in its train its own Nemesis and we feel certain that Mr. Redmond's bread cast upon the waters will return to him not after so very many days. We say the same to Egypt and Turkey. Howsoever just their demands, howsoever great their need, howsoever long they may have waited for the fulfilment of British pledges, howsoever weak the present-day statesmen's sense of the solemnity of promises made in the sight and hearing of the entire world, if they give England one more opportunity to redeem her pledges and fulfil her promises they would do that for which none will blame their generosity of heart, even though some may blame their judgment. England has gone to war with the noblest sentiments on the lips of her statesmen. No one can predict the end of such a struggle. But if England emerges out of this supreme trial of her manhood, resources and organisation, a stronger and a still more beneficent Power, then the Turks and the Eyptians just as much as the Irish and the Indians will pin her down to her promises even if she showed the least disposition to wriggle out of them. No one can say that even such a struggle would be final. The settlement may only prove—as so many settlements have proved—the seed of another and still more terrible war and unfulfilled promises have an inconvenient habit of coming home to roost. Nations do not generally trust twice without good grounds and unredeemed pledges provide their own punishment. In asking the Turks to defer the pressing of their demands by force we wish to remind them that something is even to-day due to the Allies of the Crimean War and the supporters of the Berlin Congress. Palmerston and Disraelis' assets of military and diplomatic support ought to be able to balance the liabilities of the foolish word recklessly uttered and the wise word heedlessly left unsaid by some of their successors.

We are not unappreciative of the temptations and trials of the Turks; but even here a word of caution must be uttered. They must not be lured by the blandishments of those opposed to England and her Allies. They must remember that 'War is deceit.' We desire from the bottom of our heart that this may be the last of the wars, and that human intelligence and human sence of justice may never know such constantly recurring eclipses. But we are bound to admit that as things are to-day there are some things worse than war. We shall not, therefore, pretend to believe that the Turks must have peace at any price. They must beware of entering into a quarrel, but once in it they must not come out of it till the claims both of honour and self-interest are satisfied. God knows they will have enough occasions to fight, for they have to contend against numerous army corps of prejudice and passion. That is all the more reason

that they should fight only their own battles and not those of another. At present the fear is that they may be led into the firing line in a quarrel only outwardly their own. The Turks are not wanting in gratitude. In fact, few nations could equal the Turk in those characteristics which extorted for him even from his enemies the title of 'The Only Gentleman in Eastern Europe.' To quote the old Arab saying mentioned by Gibbon, their women know not how to grant favours and their men know not how to refuse. Every Indian whom we know who has had any relations with them is loud in praises of their courtesy, which is as natural to the peasant as to the prince. But if courtesy is one of their great qualities, they also possess the defects of that great guality. In matters of business, they are imposed upon, and often imposed upon knowing that they are being imposed upon. Now nothing is more serious business than war in which a nation can destroy in a month in the way of life, energies and resources what it had taken a .generation to build. The Turk knows not what fear is, but life can be valueless only to those in the lowest scale of humanity. It is a rich treasure and a divine gift which we are not permitted by our Maker to squander. We must learn in war even more than in peace the importance and value of economy in human life. As regards material resources the Turks have never had even so much as could balance their peace requirements. All these considerations point the way in the direction of peace. This is not all. Almost every other great nation of Europe has had peace for a generation or more. Even Russia with her immense resources did not find herself equal to a second war three years after her first in which she had to fight only a small island kingdom. She has launched this new enterprise no less than a decade after her last war. France, Austria and Germany have each enjoyed nearly half a century of peace. England has not fought in a continental war for a century, and her little war against two little peasant States of South Africa, which was enough to prostrate her for many pears after, was fought no less than fifteen years ago. Servia and Montenegro alone are fighting soon after their last war. But only a child could believe that they are paying their own way. Turkey must therefore proclaim a moratorium against her warlike instincts and her clamant revenge. But if she cannot do so, and must enter this terrible business, let her make sure that the quarrel is her own, that her good nature and courtesy are not being imposed upon, and that she is not hatching a cuckoo's egg believing all the time that it is her own. We cannot withhold our admiration from the German nation that is facing the odds against itself with such courage and determination and we sometimes find it hard to repress the expression of disgust against the campaign of vilification that is being carried on with greater vigour and persistence than is deserved by German actions, harsh and ruthless though they undoubtedly are. We have not even once heard the phrase 'military exigencies" applied in their case, although the war is now nearly two months old, whereas Italy was tried in the very first month of her war on

much graver charges of brutality, discharged and declared to leave the court of Europe's humanity without a stain on her character. A thousand advocates had rushed to plead her cause unasked and had put forward the solitary plea of 'military exigencies.' The foremost among them was once our own Commander-in-Chief, Lord Roberts, whose testimonial an eminent Mussalman published in his quarrel with his community. The Germans do not seem to have spared the living and have rendered thousands of them homeless. But they have yet some way to go down the ladder of inhumanity before they could descend to the plane on which the dead are robbed of their last resting place. Lest anyone should suspect us of being isolated in having these views and expressing them in order to excite others, let us assure him in advance that he is woefully misled if he believes that a vast majority of Indians think otherwise. Had the country not been demoralised by the constant condemnation of unpalatable truths and the repeated rewarding of cheap lies, everyond in India would be confessing such admiration and sympathy openly. But admiration and sympathy are one thing, making the cause of Germany our own is another. If any cause can be ours it is the British, and if Germany counts on us she is grievously mistaken. It would be bad business for Turkey also to lavish on Germany the lives and energies and resources that she needs for her own quarrels and that Germany never spared for her when she was beset by still greater perils. We do not wish to be cynical, and selfishness has not yet come to be regarded by us as a virtue. But self-preservation is the first law of nature, and nature is inexorble and ruthless in punishing disobedience to her decalogue. Germany has done nothing yet for the Turks to deserve the sacrifice of a single Anatol, much less a street single town or village of India by the Moslem sympathisers of Turkey with a view to embarrasing their own Government. This is what we had felt impelled to tell that level-headed Turkish statesman, Talaat Bey, in private, and through him that astute diplomat, His Highness Prince Said Halim, and that soul-inspiring soldier, Damad Enver Pasha. This is what we said to the Turkish nation publicly in brief on a recent occasion. This is what say to-day in greater detail and without the least effort at disguise. We ask forgiveness for inflicting what are after all truisms and platitudes on a nation no less gifted than most of those that have been lecturing her in season and out. We do not in the least mean to insult the intelligence of Turkey, and to convince her of it we frankly confess that whether her choice is peace or war, the consequences will be hers and not ours. Hence she must exercise her own judgement and surrender it to none. If she chooses badly the suffering will be entirely hers, though the sorrow will be ours also. It was not because we believe that she is incapable of weighing these elementary considerations that we have said all that we have said. It was merely to satisfy the promptings of our own heart, for it beats in unison with the Turks'. If after balancing all considerations they decide for peace, we pray that it may, as it should, prove profitable to

them. If, however, they decide for war, we shall mingle our prayers with theirs and ask for divine protection. But if, by some evil chance, they engage in hostilities against our own Government, we shall ask them to pray for us also, for they can hardly imagine the mental anguish and the heart-pangs that will be ours. We shall be torn between two passions, or rather the same passion will be warring with itself within us. When in a household the parents fall out, whichever of them may be at fault, the children are bound to suffer. That will be our plight, and we shall deserve all the sympathy that we may secure.

What shall be our attitude towards our Government is a simple question and presents to us no difficulty. He who goes by principles and not by consequences should have not the slightest hesitation in answering it. We have of our free-will and as masters of our destinies chosen to remain in this country as the subjects of our King and Emperor and the fellow-citizens of our neighbours. We have done this because the benefits of his rule and their co-operation exceed whatever discomforts we may have felt at any time or we may be likely in future to feel. To be more particular, we had taken no pledges from England that she shall not shed the blood of our brothers even in an unrighteous war. That was not in the bond. In fact, we have not hesitated ere this in shedding the blood of our brothers on the border at the bidding of England. We have therefore given a pledge of obedience to English behests as binding as that which guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium and more binding than that which assured Egypt of its complete and early evacuation. This much must be presumed of all reasonable and intelligent beings. When we entered the field we must have known all the rules of the game. And whatever the fortunes of the game, we must abide by the rules and take both defeat and victory in the manner of sportsmen. Sir Syed Ahmad's clean-cut logic must come to the rescue of everyone who finds his situation distressing. He said in his own inimitable way: 'Our attitude towards the Government established in this country must be governed only by one consideration—the attitude of that Government towards ourselves.' Every other consideration is foreign to the subject, and whether we fight the Turks or the Russians, our services we must place at the disposal of our Government and our souls we must commend to God.

This may be a bald and unattractive sort of loyalty to those who have grown used to epics even on commonplace occasions. If so, we regret we cannot adjust our talents to their tastes. May we say, however, that our principles are our only professions, and that they are not meant so much for export as for home consumption. We have always worn our heart on our coat sleeve and we have cared not if daws peck at it. We shall not pack it in cotton wool to-day and lock it up in a Bank of England safe out of the range of official eyes. As for the writers of epics, they will never be averse to the bringing out of revised editions amended and brought up-to-date if Germany or Russia would to-morrow be mistress of India. The change

of name would hardly affect the metre.

We regret that the most mischievous and provoking article of a journal that has only too often done its best to create perils for a none too well-poised empire has compelled us to revert to a subject which we thought we had done with a month and a half ago. But the latest excursion of the *Times* into the politics of the Turks and Indian Mussalmans was so well calculated to precipitate the evil that it had set out, or pretended to have set out, to avert that we could not remain silent. This omniscient journal thinks it knows every detail of the Moslem world from the characters of Enver Pasha, its *bete noire*, and Aziz Bey, its protege—who, by the way, seems to be no better than Caesar's wife in the matter of fidelity to his patron and his patron's patron, if we trust Egyptian reports—down to the value and worth both in India and Turkey of the messages of 'Bengal Moslems.' One thing is, however, certain. It neither knows the Turks nor Indian Mussalmans. If it believes that its references to the accessibility of the Hejaz Railway, to the sowing of discard between Turk and Arab in Yemen, which it says has already begun, and to the vulnerability of Arabia, would add an iota to the fear or affections of a single Mussalman that counts at such times, it is woefully mistaken. We know that it often adopts the manner and the accent of authority when it has no more influence with those in power than it has, say, with the Kaiser. But after its sweeping success in capturing the Liberals it is apprehended that the uninitiated may take it for an official oracle. The London correspondent of the Anglo-Indian daily of Lucknow goes even so far as to say that 'the *Times* in such matters represents the views of the Foreign Office.' The danger to which we have alluded is, therefore, very real and should soon be met by official action appropriate to the occasion. England must at least officially repudiate the threats recklessly flung by the *Times* at the Turks, and in fact at the entire Moslem world. For this very reason the *Hamdard* has avoided all reference to this pernicious article of the *Times* for some of its readers may have otherwise been led to think that the *Times* cancelled at one stroke the pledges given by H.E. the Viceroy only last March. Arabia has been a Moslem land and must and shall remain Moslem to the end of the world. Even those who do not regard the Caliphate as a religious institution, or substitute for it the institution of Imamate, cannot disregard the clear mandate that after the year during which it was revealed to the Prophet of Arabia, the sacred soil was to be kept free even from the shadow of *shirk*, and He who gave that mandate did not forget to provide for such a contingency as may occur to-day. For to the mandate is attached the massage of hope which says :

و ان خفتم فسوف يغنيكم الله من فضله ان شاء
ان الله عليم حكيم

(If you fear / weakness, God will soon in His kindness make you secure if He wishes it. Verily God knows all and judges rightly.)

We have praised the clean-cut logic of Syed Ahmad Khan but what

could be clearer than the logic of God Himself, and we would advise everyone who wishes to know what a Mussalman may do or must do, and what he may not and must not, to read the 9th Chapter of the Qur'an on 'Repentance.' The limits of all contracts, legal and social, are clearly laid down and no territory is more justly or unmistakably demarcated than that of right and wrong in the dealings of Moslems with non-Moslems.

But the truest test of conscience and of courage for England is not so much to declare war on Germany for a breach of Belgium's treaty rights as to evacuate Egypt of her own free will even before a diplomatic demand is formulated by Trukey or Egypt. Nothing would shame Germany so well as this act of clear justice. The embarkation of the last English soldier from Alexandria will put the fear of God into the heart of the Kaiser more assuredly than the disembarkation of the last English soldier available in the Empire at Boulogne or Havre. The Uzbegs had troubled the Moghals a great deal on the borders of India when Shah Jahan sent Aurangzeb to punish them. The battle was at its hottest when the hour of evening prayer arrived. With characteristic coolness Aurangzeb spread his prayer mat on the ground in the thickest part of the battle and bent his head in silent submission before the Lord God of War. The chief of the Uzbegs was an unobserved witness of this simple scene and when Aurangzeb had finished his prayer, he came and laid down his arms before him. 'To fight against such a man,' said the Chief of the Uzbegs, 'is madness; I'll have none of it.' If this is really a war of Right against Might, of Conscience against soul-crushing Militarism, of the Sacredness of Treaties and the Dignity of Law against their treatment as mere 'Scraps of Paper' and Moral Impediments in the advance of Brute Eorce, and Clean Hands are sincerely adjudged better than Countless Hordes, then England must go to the Land of the Sphinx and solve the new riddle of this war in the only way it can be solved. It must leave Egypt. Need we say this will win over to her side the Mussalmans of the world better than all the threats of the tactful *Times* and the promises of destroying Turkey's contracts with Germany *after* Germany has herself been destroyed. This is the claim of self-interest. This way lies the path of duty. Whatever may have kept England in Egypt thirty or twenty years ago, to-day England is there because she prefers the route of Lesseps to India to that of Vasco da Gama. Germany needed only a temporary right of way through Belgium. England should in all conscience be satisfied with a permanent right of way through Egypt. But to come as friends of the owner of the land and to protect him from unruly tenants, and then not to be satisfied even with the right of way through his fields but to claim a practical ownership is neither friendly nor honourable. Let England have the *iter*, but the *dominum* must remain with Turkey and the usufruct with the Khedive. Will not England be satisfied with the easement?

We have already filled many pages but, before we conclude, let us repeat that whatever England may do to

Turkey or Egypt, our anchor holds. All truly loyal people have closed the chapter of civic controversy with the officials and into that book they are likely to look no more. Whatever our grievances, whatever reforms we desire, everything must wait for a more seasonable occasion. Even if the Government were to concede to us all that we ever desired or dreamt, if, for instance, the Moslem University were offered to us on our own terms, or the Press Act repeal were to be announced, or even if Self-Government were to be conceded to us, we would humbly tell Government this is no time for it, and we must for the present decline such concessions with thanks. Concessions are asked for and accepted in peace. We are not Russian Poles. We need no bribes!